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Abstract
Sex robots are a controversial topic. Understood as artificial-intelligence enhanced
humanoid robots designed for use in partnered and solo sex, sex robots offer ample
opportunities for theorizing from a Human-Machine Communication (HMC) perspective.
This comparative literature review conjoins the seemingly disconnected literatures of
HMC and sexuality studies (SeS) to explore questions surrounding intimacy, love, desire,
sex, and sexuality among humans and machines. In particular, I argue for understanding
human-machine sexualities as communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages, extending
previous efforts in both HMC and SeS for more-than-human, ecological, and more fluid
approaches to humans and machines, as well as to sex and sexuality. This essay continues
and expands the critical turn in HMC by engaging in an interdisciplinary exercise with theoretical, design, and use/effect implications in the context of sex robots.
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For an introductory price of less than $10,000, interested customers may purchase
“affordable” sex robots from Abyss Creations’ RealDoll, one of the leading manufacturers
of sex robots. At the time of this writing, most sex robots consist of high-end sex dolls
equipped with an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced robotic head. Fully robotic sex bots
are nonetheless in the works by many companies worldwide. The case of sex robots opens
particularly interesting questions that reverberate across many domains of society, from
companionship and intimacy to therapeutic usage and questions regarding the (il)legality
of child sex dolls (e.g., Chatterjee, 2020). Opinions range from calls for abolishing sex
robots (Campaign Against Porn Robots, n.d.1; Richardson, 2016a, 2016b) to heralding the
many social and individual benefits (Levy, 2007a), with a broad range of opinions located
somewhere between these extremes (e.g., Ess, 2018).
In this essay, I explore human-machine sexualities at the intersection of humanmachine communication (HMC) and sexuality studies (SeS). My aim in this essay is to
engage in a comparative literature review that seeks to elaborate on the interdisciplinary
intersections between the work in these two different fields, demonstrating how and why
research on the subject of sex robots can inform work in HMC and how efforts in HMC
can provide new insights for the study of sex robots, particularly from an SeS perspective.
In doing so, I respond to Döring et al.’s (2020) call to increase the degree of theoretical elaboration of human-sex robot relations. With the arrival of interactive and communicative
sex robots, I ponder the question, How can the bodies of literature in HMC and SeS enrich
each other in the context of sex robots? In particular, by drawing on SeS in conjunction with
HMC, I ask: In what ways do human-machine sexual relations alter our understanding of
sexuality? What happens to our understanding of love and eroticism, intimacy and sexual
closeness when the other is AI? In what ways does humans’ interaction with sex bots affect
ontologizing processes, or the drawing of boundaries between humans and machines (Fortunati & Edwards, 2021)? In conjoining the emerging field of HMC with the rich, critical,
and incoherent body of SeS, I punctuate how machines reconstitute sexualities and work
the fuzzy edges in response to Hearn’s (2018) question, “what are the boundaries around
[human] sexuality?” (p. 1368). More directly, what exactly constitutes the boundaries of
human sexuality if the sexual partner is nonhuman?
This work continues earlier calls for mobilizing a critical perspective in HMC. Particularly in the realm of human-machine encounters where humans interact with machineothers in the creation of meaning (Fortunati & Edwards, 2020; Guzman, 2018), a critical
communication perspective attunes us to the ways in which sociohistorical and cultural
systems shape the ways in which humans make sense of machines (Dehnert & Leach, 2021).
By turning to the rich context of human-machine sexualities and sex robots, I seek to further flesh out what a critical communication perspective to the study of machines and their
co-creation of meaning with humans entails. In doing so, I argue that interdisciplinary
approaches are necessary to fully capture the societal implications of machines, which I
1. In July of 2021, the organization formerly known as Campaign Against Sex Robots announced its name
change to Campaign Against Porn Robots to reflect that, according to the campaign organizers, sexual activities
involving robots are not “actual” sex but rather reflect processes of pornification and objectification (Campaign
Against Porn Robots, n.d.; see also Danaher et al., 2017). The distinction between porn and sex related to robots
seems to indicate the safeguarding of (human-to-human) notions of sex understood in the context of authenticity, intimacy, love, and connection, which are bypassed by the more-than-human framework of communicative
sexuotechnical-assemblage put forth in this essay.

Dehnert

133

demonstrate by bringing SeS in conversation with HMC. HMC offers a rich contextual
framework for making sense of human-machine sexualities, and sex robots constitute an
intriguing context for investigating the boundaries of machines as communicative others.
By conjoining HMC and SeS, I investigate where one draws the boundaries between sex
robots, sex toys, and other emerging technologies in the broader realm of the sexual and
between (sex) robots and (a/sexual) humans.
As such, the main goal of this essay is to argue that the case of sex robots illustrates the
necessity for critical approaches to human-machine relations (in HMC) and to sexuality
(in SeS) writ large. I begin this argument by reviewing the ways in which machines are cast
as communicative others and further outline the implications of a critical communication
perspective to HMC. After I tentatively differentiate sex robots from other technologies, I
specifically utilize interdisciplinary more-than-human approaches to both machines and
sexuality, extending Flore and Pienaar’s (2020) notion of sexuotechnical-assemblage to
describe the distinctly technological dimension of sexuality in human-machine relations.
Further, by recasting sexuality as assemblage, I follow Fox and Alldred’s (2013) approach
which “shifts the location of sexuality away from bodies and individuals, toward the affective flow within assemblages of bodies, things, ideas, and social institutions, and the (sexual) capacities produced in bodies by this flow” (p. 770). Conjoining this work, and thereby
extending Martinez’s (2011) attention to communicative sexualities, I argue for describing human-machine sexualities as communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages. Finally,
recasting sexuality in these geographic registers of relationality and assemblage responds
to ongoing critiques of sexual science’s continued exclusion of and violence toward sexual
others via pathologization (Flore, 2014), compounded colonization (Balestrery, 2012), and
normalization (Irvine, 1990; Somerville, 1994). I conclude this essay with theoretical and
design implications.

HMC and the Machine-Other
HMC constitutes a rapidly growing field within the broader realm of communication studies focused on the ways in which humans interact with machine-others. What sets HMC
apart from related fields is the focus on the communication processes between humans
and machines in which the machine is not rendered as a channel through which humans
communicate, but as “a communicative subject” with whom humans interact (Guzman,
2018, p. 12; Fortunati & Edwards, 2020). I use “machine-others” (rather than “machine”
itself) to highlight this communicative subjectivization of the machine in HMC encounters. Understood as “the creation of meaning among humans and machines” (Guzman, 2018,
p. 1, emphasis in original), HMC addresses topics such as agency (Banks & de Graaf, 2020),
ontological boundaries (Edwards, 2018; Guzman, 2020), and the role and applicability of
human-to-human scripts to human-machine encounters (Dehnert & Leach, 2021; Westerman et al., 2020).
In the context of HMC, the Computers Are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm—and,
more recently, the Media Are Social Actors (MASA) paradigm (Lombard & Xu, 2021)—and
constructivist approaches have been utilized to describe the ways in which humans relate
to and interact with machines (e.g., Gambino et al., 2020; Nass & Moon, 2000; Westerman
et al., 2020). Roughly (for reviews see Fortunati & Edwards, 2021; Westerman et al., 2020),
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CASA/MASA and constructivist approaches explain the ways in which humans apply previously learned communication scripts to their encounters with machines. Conceiving of
human-machine encounters through a Buberian I-Thou framework allows for the application of human-human communication theories to HMC contexts (Westerman et al., 2020).
Recently, however, scholars have called for mobilizing a critical communication perspective
in HMC to reconsider the ways in which the machine-other is otherized in human-machine encounters, asking questions related to ableism, gendered and sexed dynamics, as
well as processes of racialization (Fortunati & Edwards, 2021; e.g., Davis & Stanovsek, 2021;
Dehnert & Leach, 2021; Liu, 2021; Moran, 2020).
The context of sex robots offers unique vantage points for furthering critical perspectives in HMC. On the one hand, this context allows for drawing on the rich literature in
SeS—where sexuality emerges as a sociohistorical formation, “a vital means of pleasure,
interpersonal connection, personal efficacy, and acceptance of one’s body and of self more
generally” (Wilkerson, 2011, p. 194). Thus, in addition to previous critical work in HMC,
the context of sex robots invites other intersectional markers of difference theorized in
SeS, queer and trans (of color) criticism, and feminist and crip theories: In addition to
dis/ability, this involves sex, sexuality, gender, race, class, and age, among others.
On the other hand, sex robots allow for exploring the complex implications of communicative sexual machine-others on intimate relations, including major social, legal, political, and ethical implications regarding the role of sex/uality for humans. After all, as Flore
(2014) insists, “The birth of the sexual sciences, and the development of sexology and psychiatry, were and remain an attempt to define and delimit the meaning of being human
itself ” (p. 18, emphasis in original; see also Foucault, 1978). Similarly, HMC engages ontological questions regarding the divides between humans, machines, and animals (Edwards,
2018; Guzman, 2020). For instance, although CASA states that humans treat machines as if
they were people, “we may not always respond to people in a very interpersonal way,” meaning that human-human interaction is oftentimes heavily scripted (Westerman et al., 2020,
p. 403). This opens profound questions about what exactly characterizes human-human
relationality and how it differs from human-machine relationality (Dehnert, 2021; Westerman et al., 2020).
In the context of asexuality studies, Flore (2014) argued that “to be human is to be sexual” and outlined the ways in which sexuality is compulsory in the context of the human
(p. 19). In the following section, I take up Flore’s and other SeS scholars’ insights regarding
the ways in which sexual science and sexology pathologize, otherize, and violently exclude
deviance in sexual behavior, orientation, and identity to add to the ongoing conversations
on sex robots and their implications. I review existing research on sex robots from an interdisciplinary perspective to highlight the ripe potential of conjoining this body of literature
with HMC, specifically punctuating and extending Flore and Pienaar’s (2020) notion of
sexuotechnical-assemblage.

Sex Robots: A Controversial Technology and/in HMC
Sex robots are a controversial and highly debated topic in lay and academic circles, including
but not limited to legal, ethical, design, feminist, clinical, therapeutic, and other perspectives

Dehnert

135

(for a review, see Döring et al., 2020). After conducting their review of interdisciplinary literature focused on sex dolls and sex robots, Döring et al. (2020) conclude that
Predictions of small and/or ambivalent effects might be more realistic [than the
dystopian or utopian visions so prevalent in the literature] but are seldom discussed in the academic literature thus far, which seems to mirror some of the
hype and scandalization observable in public media discourses. (p. 21)
As one potential explanation for these dramatized perspectives, Döring and colleagues
name the fact that many people do not have firsthand experiences with sex robots due to
their scarcity and cost. Some scholars project, however, that people will gain significantly
more experience with sex bots and, in 2050, it will be not only common for folks to experience sex and love with machines (Levy, 2007a), but that humans might actually have more
sex with robots than with other humans (Pearson, 2015; see Hauskeller, 2017, for an important critique of such transhumanist visions). In light of these rather bold projections, it is
necessary to further our understanding of human-machine sexualities.
Technology and sexuality have been embraced by many scholars, given the myriad ways in which technology—broadly understood as biomedical, biomechanical, and
biodigital—is related to sexuality. Scholars have written on technologies in the realm of the
sexual, such as pharmaceuticals (Flore, 2018), technology in pornography (Dekker et al.,
2021), and sex robots. In the literature on sex technologies, and also in public perception,
sex toys emerge as one of the more prominent technologies. Understood as “material objects
selected, created, and used to generate or enhance sexual arousal and pleasure in both solo
and partnered sex” (Döring, 2021b, p. 1), sex toys include both commercially produced and
homemade objects such as vibrators or masturbators. Recent models including wireless sex
toys or otherwise digitized and connected sex toys have been the focal point of scholars and
designers, usually labeled teledildonics (Flore & Pienaar, 2020). These technologies are marketed as sensory devices that allow for haptic or kinaesthetic interaction between partners
across distance, or with the technology that responds to movement and touch. Typically
paired with smartphone applications (apps), these devices allow for personalization and
recording of personal preferences, promising “to increase sexual performance and pleasure
through the algorithmic analysis of data” (Flore & Pienaar, 2020, p. 280). However, critics
note that teledildonics reintroduce well-discussed issues regarding sexual safety and normativity. For instance, Sparrow and Karas (2020) argue that teledildonics allow for “rape by
deception,” or the risk of being deceived about the sexual partner’s features and/or about
which person the user was having “sex” with. Thus, while teledildonics promise increased
sexual pleasure and intimacy, these connected technologies raise intriguing questions about
intimacy, sexual practices, and human interaction.
But what distinguishes a sex robot from a sex doll, a teledildonics device, or any other
sex toy? Cognizant of Fortunati and Edwards’s (2021) insight that “Robots have such
a multiform and mutant body that it becomes difficult to talk of robots’ identity as well
as of robots’ capabilities” in a general sense (p. 16), and aware of the rapid technological
advances in the fields of robotics and AI, any attempt at defining sex robots must inevitably
be incomplete and tentative. Moreover, definitions and designs vary, particularly regarding
the role and prominence of AI and other robotic features of sex robots. This also includes
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differences in the level of sophistication as it relates to the AI personalities being sold to
customers across various models. Current technology is rather rudimentary (Döring et al.,
2020); however, sex robots currently on the market should not be confused with advanced
machines depicted in science fiction, which are oftentimes imagined having sentience, consciousness, free will, and the like. In a recent attempt at defining sex robots, Döring (2021a)
offers “human-like, full-body, anatomically correct, humanoid service robots of different
materials, technologies, and price ranges that are designed and used to generate or enhance
sexual arousal and pleasure in both solo and partnered sex” (p. 1). What sets sex robots
apart from sex dolls, then, is that they are “equipped with sensors, actuators, and artificial
intelligence” (p. 1)—in short, some sort of automated or mechanical technological features
that allow the sex robot to move, talk, or otherwise interact with the human user.
In the case of the aforementioned Abyss Creations’ RealDoll, for instance, customers
can purchase AI-enhanced, robotic heads that can be added to sex dolls. Users can customize their sex dolls/robots in many ways, including body shape, skin tone, eye color,
make-up, face, hair, and more. The AI-enhanced head allows for users to engage with their
sex robot in various ways, including conversation, and the robotic head includes features
such as eye movement, facial expression, as well as neck and mouth movement. With the
accompanying app, users can fully customize their sex robot’s personality, allowing the AI
to learn the user’s interests and preferences. RealDoll’s dolls and robots are available as
male, female, and transsexual models. Users can even purchase Bluetooth-enabled haptic
vaginal sensors for the dolls which “can detect touch, movement, and transitions from mild
arousal to orgasm” (RealDoll, n.d.a). In short, most contemporary sex robots are sex dolls
enhanced with very limited AI and robotic features, oftentimes limited to specific body
parts (head, vaginal sensors), and with limited interactive capabilities (conversation, eye
movement, haptic feedback). Nonetheless, compared to sex dolls, these more interactive
technological capabilities of sex robots are imagined leading to potentially rich relationships and shared, communicatively constructed meaning, where expected capabilities of
sex robots involve hearing, recognizing objects, talking, or even taking initiative, among
others (Scheutz & Arnold, 2016). The current sex robot market is advancing rapidly—as
is the technology—but difficult to review, not least given the vast social stigma associated
with this technology and its users. It is important to note that relations with each product
differ, given variance in robotic capabilities, AI affordances, levels of sophistication, and
user characteristics.
Notwithstanding these rather limited robotic and interactive functions of contemporary sex robots, scholars have expressed a variety of concerns and hopes in relation to
sex robots (for reviews, see Döring et al., 2020; González-González et al., 2021). Although
sparked by transhumanist researchers like Levy (2007a), the debate on sex robots has
broadly considered domestic, commercial, and therapeutic use of sex robots (Döring et
al., 2020). As such, target audiences and potential uses of sex robots vary, which shapes the
production and design of sex robots (see Harper & Lievesley, 2020). These debates are additionally complicated by the “purely speculative” nature of claims about current and future
effects as well as potential benefits and harms of sex robots and the scarcity of empirical
studies thus far (Döring et al., 2020, p. 2). In addition to several edited collections (e.g.,
Bendel, 2020; Cheok et al., 2016; Cheok & Zhang, 2019; Danaher & McArthur, 2017; Zhou
& Fischer, 2019) and monographs (e.g., Levy, 2007a), scholars have written about sex robots
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related to their conceptualization and theory (e.g., Danaher, 2017a); engaged in legal and
ethical considerations related to rape (e.g., Sparrow, 2017) or child robots (e.g., Chatterjee, 2020); investigated humans’ perceptions of and attitudes toward sex robots (e.g., Middleweek, 2021; Scheutz & Arnold, 2016, 2017); examined potential therapeutic use of sex
robots including health implications (Cox-George & Bewley, 2018) or potential use of sex
robots for persons with disabilities (e.g., Fosch-Villaronga & Poulsen, 2021); critiqued sex
robot representation in art and media (for a review see Döring & Poeschl, 2019); and have
considered design questions (e.g., Danaher, 2019a).
Interestingly, Döring et al. (2020) did not report studies on sex robots conducted from
a communication studies perspective, highlighting the need for communication scholars
to contribute to this broad context and diverse literature. That is, with their focus on how
meaning is created in human-machine interactions, HMC scholars can provide unique and
novel insights into the characterization and understanding of sex robots. Thus, theorizing
within HMC suggests an alternative perspective to what sets sex robots apart from adjacent
technologies such as sex dolls, teledildonics, and other sex toys. In fact, as Döring et al.
(2020) report, the current sex robot literature “often falls back on binary thinking” when it
comes to conceptualizing sex robots:
It categorizes the current sex robot as an inanimate object and mere masturbation aid without any sociability and is only willing to ascribe sociability to
future imagined sex robots that are advanced to the point of indistinguishability
from humans. Hence, the literature on sex robots often misses the key point
that robots are more than mere masturbation aids due to anthropomorphization
and that they are meaningful and possibly helpful precisely because they are not
substitutes for real humans but are sociotechnical entities for parasocial use and
play. (p. 20)
HMC has a lot to contribute in response to this diagnosis, given the ongoing theorizing
of human-machine relationships with a focus on meaning-making in the field. Moreover,
ongoing scholarly efforts in the CASA/MASA paradigms as well as ontologizing efforts
(Edwards, 2018; Guzman, 2020) within HMC offer ample opportunities to contribute to
research and theory of sex robots. In fact, recent efforts for a critical turn in HMC (Fortunati & Edwards, 2021) and posthuman perspectives (e.g., Betlemidze, 2022; Dehnert, 2021)
provide useful theoretical backdrops for exploring sex robots and how human-machine
sexualities alter our understanding of humans, machines, and sexualities. In the next section, I elaborate how these perspectives support understanding human-machine sexualities
as communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages.

Human-Machine Sexualities as Communicative
Sexuotechnical-Assemblages
This essay is not the first attempt at connecting more-than-human thought and other close
relatives, such as posthumanism, new materialism, vital materialism, or object-oriented
ontology to human-machine interactions (e.g., Betlemidze, 2022; Dehnert, 2021; Dehnert
& Leach, 2021; Kubes, 2019; Ornella, 2009). For instance, in her critique of Richardson’s
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absolute stance against sex robots (Campaign Against Porn Robots, n.d.), which is built
around a normative conception of “real sex,” Kubes (2019) highlights the hidden, normative
assumptions regarding “proper sex” and “proper love,” and asks profound questions: “Does
loving and feeling loved necessarily require its object to ‘love back’? Or does it suffice, when
the loving person assumes that their love is shared? I am leaning toward the latter” (Kubes,
2019, p. 4, emphasis in original). More directly located within a philosophical and ethical
approach to HMC, scholars have described what Gerdes (2015) refers to as the social relational turn, specifically as it relates to the moral consideration of robots. Authors such as
Coeckelbergh (2010, 2012), Gunkel (2012, 2018), and Gerdes have engaged in an ongoing
conversation related to the moral standing of robots, with Coeckelbergh (2010, 2012) and
Gunkel (2012, 2018) arguing more strongly for a social relational approach where moral
status is not dependent on an entity’s properties but viewed as socially constructed in the
situated relationship, and Gerdes arguing for a human-centered framework. As Coeckelbergh (2010) argues, for a social relational approach to robot ethics, “moral significance
resides neither in the object nor in the subject, but in the relation between the two” (p. 214).
Although the question of moral consideration in the case of sex robots is important, as Ess
(2016, 2018) demonstrates, these philosophical issues go beyond the scope of this essay.
Nonetheless, in asking these kinds of questions, scholarly debates surrounding social relations, new materialism, and other more-than-human endeavors offer profound challenges
to fundamental concepts in both SeS and HMC, questioning the concepts of subject, object,
their relationship, their respective agency, and more.
Elsewhere (Dehnert, 2021), I have already engaged in a speculative exercise in what
I call machine geographies—more-than-human communication geographies of humanmachine encounters. In addition to the philosophical efforts related to the social relational
turn described above, I employed geographical registers of agency, aesthetics, and ecology to outline what more-than-human approaches to HMC can look like. This includes,
perhaps most profoundly, a recasting of agency in human-machine interactions as “relational, assemblage, fluid, in-between actors, as making-with, as achievement within networks, and becoming,” thereby bypassing any considerations of communicative subject and
object (Dehnert, 2021, p. 1154). Resonating with the aforementioned social relational turn,
a more-than-human perspective allows for recasting human-machine interaction as relation. By focusing on relationality and the entanglements of humans and machines, scholars
are not occupied with drawing fixed boundaries between humans and machines or with
determining subject- and object-status in communicative encounters, but can embrace a
“shift in focus from epistemological questions—such as what the objects ‘represent’—to
ontological questions about the kinds of qualities that they help to materialise or enact”
(Flore & Pienaar, 2020, p. 283).
SeS scholars have also called for a similar shift in their respective field to move understandings of sexuality away from person-based definitions. The fields of sexual science and
sexology are continuously critiqued by the more humanities- and critical-leaning SeS for
medicalizing and “healthicizing” sexuality (notions such as “healthy sex drive” or “healthy
sex behavior”), pathologizing and erasing non-normative sexual behaviors and identities,
and for the continued ignorance toward the whiteness and racialized cisheterosexism so
prominent among social scientific approaches to sex and sexuality (e.g., Balestrery, 2012;
Flore, 2014; Irvine, 1990; Manalansan, 2013; Somerville, 1994). Work such as Balestrery’s
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explication of compounded colonization highlight the mutually informing and enforcing,
racialized and sexualized ideological paradigms in sexology and sexual science. Efforts
by Marxist feminists showcase the intricated connections between market-driven and
labor-related notions of sex as a transaction in a neoliberal context, particularly as it relates
to consumption (e.g., Miller-Young, 2014; Zatz, 1997). Similarly, studies of racialized sexualities (cf. Ferguson, 2007), specifically Black sexualities of anti-respectability in the context
of sex work among Black queer women femmes (Glover & Glover, 2019) or Black women in
pornography (Miller-Young, 2014) challenge not only the alive-and-well scientific racism
and pathologizing of non-normative sexual subjectivities, practices, and identities, but also
call for theorizing from the perspective of those marginalized by normativities constituted
around white, cishetero, abled, settler perspectives.
Together, these critical endeavors in SeS understand sexuality not as the “biological,
psychological and social processes associated with sexual desire, sensation, arousal, attraction and pleasure” (Fox & Alldred, 2013, p. 785n1), but as a sociohistorical formation that
is constructed, imbricated by stratified formations of power, and itself a stratifying force on
a societal level (Foucault, 1978). Such a shift away from a person-centered approach to sexuality resonates with Martinez’s (2011) musings on the communicative nature of sexuality,
the study of which means “to locate the phenomenon of sexuality within the intricacies of
our immediate and embodied interconnection with the social and cultural world in which
we are situated” (p. 11). Thusly reframed, sexuality is no longer confined to the property of
persons nor the “intimate” spaces between people, or around one person individually, but
is conceptualized as a fundamental mechanism of and in societies—a social technology in
the Foucauldian sense—that both disciplines bodies while opening up space for resistance.
In this sense,
sexual agency [is] not merely [understood] as the capacity to choose, engage
in, or refuse sex acts, but as a more profound good that is in many ways socially
based, involving not only a sense of oneself as a sexual being but also a larger
social dimension in which others recognize and respect one’s identity.
(Wilkerson, 2011, p. 195)
Additionally, Martinez (2011) highlights that this revisited notion of sexuality “is actualized only by the virtue of communicative processes in which we are always and inescapably situated” (p. 11, emphasis in original). Resonating with a social relational turn in the
moral consideration of robots (Coeckelbergh, 2012), then, these perspectives prioritize the
situated relation in the description of sexuality over entities’ ontological properties.
This challenge to person-based understandings of sexuality and communication, as
well as sexual and communicative relations and agency, can be further complemented by
Deleuzo-Guattarian (1988) perspectives on assemblage. Drawing from anti-essentialist,
anti-humanist, and Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, Fox and Alldred (2013) offer sexualityassemblage as a theoretical move that overturns anthropocentric specters of sexuality
focused on the individual human body. In their thick, sociological rethinking of sexuality as
assemblage, they shift “the location of sexuality . . . toward the affective flow within assemblages of bodies, things, ideas and social institutions, and the (sexual) capacities produced
in bodies by this flow” (p. 770). This rethinking of sexuality as assemblage, in relational,
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ecological, and interconnected ways, resonates strongly with the similar shift in HMC outlined above. Not only do Fox and Alldred draw on similar theoretical bodies of thought, they
also apply Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblages as desiring-machines to highlight
the role of affective flows, processual interactions, and the dissolution of sexual subjectobject pairings when shifting to sexuality-assemblage (e.g., Deleuze & Guattari, 1988).
Unlike person-based notions of sexual agency, then, Fox and Alldred (2013) consider
agency as the “capacity to affect or be affected” (p. 772) and dislocate any considerations
regarding sexual object-choice or musings on the object of someone’s desire by pointing
out that “productive desire makes affect flow in assemblages” (Fox & Alldred, 2013, p. 773).
Crucially, this shift toward assemblage allows Fox and Alldred to reconceptualize sexuality
as “the flow of affect in a sexuality-assemblage,” manifesting in two ways: First, sexuality as
the “deterritorializing, nomadic and rhizomic flow of affect between and around bodies
and other relations” as a sociohistorical formation that suffuses much if not all of social life,
and second, in the form of individual sexual desire, as a “territorialization of an impersonal,
non-human and nomadic sexuality” (pp. 767–777, emphasis in original). This approach
allows for recasting anthropocentric, humanist idea(l)s of sexuality, sexual agency, desire,
resistance, and the relevance of sexuality as “a fundamental experience of what it means to
be human” (Ornella, 2009, p. 318; Flore, 2014).
In their more-than-human work on “data-driven intimacy” and teledildonics, Flore and
Pienaar (2020) adapt Fox and Alldred’s (2013) sexuality-assemblage and explicitly connect
it to technology such as data, algorithms, and wireless sex toys. They offer nuance to Fox
and Alldred’s (2013) above conceptualization of sexuality-assemblage and outline what they
term sexuotechnical-assemblage, “a term that points to the range of actors and relations
imbricated in teledildonic sex [and in human-machine sexualities, I would add], including
human bodies and desires, sexual practices, technological devices, internet connections,
intimate data, and neoliberal understandings of sexual health” and normative sexual desire,
practices, and identities (Flore & Pienaar, 2020, p. 285).
Together, machine geographies (Dehnert, 2021) and sexuotechnical-assemblage (Flore
& Pienaar, 2020; Fox & Alldred, 2013) allow for reimagining human-machine sexualities
in important and useful ways. First, assembled sexual and communicative (or sexuocommunicative) relationalities between humans and machines ultimately displace questions that seek to investigate the ways in which machines emerge as communicative and
sexual subjects in human-machine encounters. This does not imply a recurse to casting
machines as mere objects or channels of human-human interaction and desire, given that
assemblage simultaneously displaces the object. In this way, directionality of both desire
and communication in (sexual) human-machine encounters is bypassed in favor of entangled, relational, affective, and aesthetic flows.
Second, adopting the perspective of sexuotechnical-assemblage for human-machine
encounters reconceptualizes ongoing scholarly concerns regarding machine agency by displacing humanist attempts at locating agency within the machine. For instance, in their rich
treatise on the foundations of erobotics (the transdisciplinary field concerned with artificial
erotic agents), Dubé and Anctil (2021) describe erobots as agents by using the “broadest
definition recognized and commonly used” in AI, robotics, and machine learning, where
“the agency of machines refers to their capability to act intelligently in and on the world to
achieve objectives of their own” (p. 1207). Reconceptualizing agency as not inherent to a
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machine agent also speaks to the aforementioned social relational turn in the moral consideration of robots. In this vein, communicative sexuotechnical-assemblage focuses on the
affective flow between inter-actants in relational, ecological, and assembled relations.
Third, the assemblage-perspective offers generative, alternative conceptualizations in
response to, arguably decidedly, anthropocentric entry points into philosophical, ethical,
and feminist conversations related to sex robots. For instance, in his ethical musings on the
possibility of sex, love, and intimacy with sex robot, Ess (2018) concludes that “sexbots, as
zombies lacking first-person phenomenal consciousness, genuine emotions, and (embodied) desire, will only be able to fake emotions” (p. 253). For Ess (2016, 2018), then, due to
these shortcomings, it will be impossible to reach “complete sex,” a high ethical standard for
sexual relationships which is characterized by mutual desire and respect. Albeit holding a
more radical position, the arguments put forth by what Danaher (2019a) calls “anti-sexbot
feminism” (e.g., Campaign Against Porn Robots, n.d.; Richardson, 2016a, 2016b) take a similar stand toward what qualifies as proper, good, or authentic sex, which is therefore only
limited to human-human sexuality. In response to these arguments, Danaher (2019a) draws
on sex-positive feminist perspectives to articulate how we might build better sex robots,
rather than follow Richardson and others’ call for restricting them (see also Danaher &
McArthur, 2017; Danaher et al., 2017). Pointing out the necessity for feminist insights into
the content, process, and context for their creation, Danaher’s (2019a) work represents the
potential for conjoining critical perspectives of sex robots with their production. Importantly, an assemblage-perspective as argued for in this essay does not sidestep these important conversations, which matter in the context of child sex robots, for instance (Danaher,
2019b). Rather, it allows for alternative entry points that seek to increase the degree of theoretical elaboration of human-sex robot relations (Döring et al., 2020).
And, finally, by displacing concerns related to subject-object divides as well as notions
of individualized agency, the assemblage-perspective both implicates the sociocultural in
the intimate, and the intimate in the sociocultural. Returning to Fox and Alldred’s (2013)
language of (de)territorializing sexuality, they recognize that, while affective flows of/in
sexuality-assemblages are unrestricted, they are often highly limited (“territorialized”)
based on individual and sociocultural contexts: “Sexual attraction, sexual preferences and
proclivities are . . . territorializations toward particular objects of desire, consequent upon
the particular mix of relations and affects deriving from physical and social contexts, experience and culture” (p. 775). As such, an assemblage-perspective is neither naïve toward
norms and normativities (or scripts, cf. Dehnert & Leach, 2021) nor forecloses resistance
and a rescripting of these cultural norms; in fact, the territorializing, deterritorializing, and
reterritorializing dynamics within the sexuality-assemblage allow for resisting, reshaping,
and transforming compulsory forms of sexuality (Emens, 2014; Flore, 2014). Therefore,
human-machine sexualities as assemblage offer ripe entry points for critical approaches,
both from an HMC and an SeS perspective.

Implications for HMC and SeS
In this comparative literature review, I have conjoined two rather disconnected bodies
of literature in an effort to revisit sex robots in/as human-machine sexualities. I argued
that, in addition to sensory, robotic, and AI-components (Döring, 2021a), what sets sex
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robots apart from other sexual technologies is not so much their status as agents in sexual
human-machine encounters, but rather the ways in which humans may relate with them;
said differently, their capacity to create meaning with humans in human-machine sexualities, or communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages. In doing so, I respond to not only
more-than-human efforts in HMC, but also to calls for fluidifying academic discourse on
sexuality (Lambevski, 2004).

Theoretical Implications
Theorizing human-machine sexualities as communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages by
conjoining rather disconnected bodies of literature and theoretical perspectives responds
to recent calls for transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of sex
robots (e.g., Döring et al., 2020; Zhou & Fischer, 2020). Collectively, these approaches allow
for more nuanced perspectives of sex robots that reject both the utopian visions of unending pleasure with sex robots (Levy, 2007a; Ornella, 2009) and the dystopian fears of those
who call for abolishing sex robots (Campaign Against Porn Robots, n.d.). Grounded in
communication and sexuality studies, and adjacent fields, the concept of communicative
sexuotechnical-assemblage adds to existing, more philosophical and ethical projects in
the context of machines generally (Coeckelbergh, 2010, 2012; Gerdes, 2015; Gunkel, 2012,
2018) and of sex robots specifically (e.g., Danaher, 2017b; Ess, 2016, 2018). By examining
the affective flows between humans and machines in sexual encounters, scholars can track
the various ethical, legal, sociological, and communicative issues addressed in the literature and raised by sex robots. This also includes a move beyond the binary thinking in the
current literature, identified by Döring et al. (2020) and already elaborated on above. In so
doing, human-machine sexualities continue and extend the recent critical turn in HMC by
specifically turning to sex and sexuality as ripe contexts, and SeS as rich resources for critical
efforts in HMC.
For instance, drawing on critical perspectives challenges reductionistic and problematic conceptions of sex work in debates on sex robots (Kubes, 2019). Authors such as Richardson (2016a, 2016b) or Levy (2007b), among others, who compare robot sex with human
sex work, tend to fall back on understandings of sex work that frame the sex worker as
“objectified and instrumentalized” (Danaher, 2017b, pp. 110–111) or as “reduced to a thing”
(Richardson, 2016b, p. 291, emphasis in original). Critical SeS and, in particular, Marxist
feminist, Black queer, crip, trans, and trans of color approaches offer a dramatically different and resistant understanding of sex work, guided by anti-respectability politics that
highlight how “community members thrive despite existing in a hostile world unconcerned
with their survival” (Glover & Glover, 2019, p. 172). Moreover, Danaher (2014) offered
a nuanced understanding of sex work as it relates to what he describes as technological
unemployment, or the displacement of human sex workers by the advent of sophisticated
sex robots. This effort continues specifically Marxist and materialist understandings that
correctly frame sex work in the context of labor and market dynamics. Drawing on critical non-white, non-cisheterosexist, and non-cisheteropatriarchal accounts of sexuality
therefore simultaneously resists reductionistic accounts of sex work and sexuality writ large
and opens up different ways to theorize and practice sexuality—both among humans and
between humans and nonhumans.
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Another implication based on the critical sensibilities inherent to communicative
sexuotechnical-assemblages in human-machine sexual encounters is the ongoing critique
of transhumanist utopias and fantasies in relation to sex robots (e.g., Lakshmanan, 2021).
Specifically from the perspective of (critical) disability studies, transhumanist desires
to improve, enhance, and perfect the human body either by modifying human bodies
or by replacing “deficient” and “defunct” human bodies with better, and more “perfect”
machine-others must grapple with ableist discourse of “curing” and “overcoming” disability
(Hauskeller, 2017). Similar dynamics between sexuality and dis/ability have been centered
by scholars in a/sexuality studies (e.g., Flore, 2014; Kafer, 2013; Wilkerson, 2011); efforts
that consistently critique the normative formations of a “sexual” body, a “healthy” body, and
“healthy” sexuality writ large. Human-machine sexualities navigate these important critiques by disregarding any consideration of enhancing the sexual other or sexuality as such,
given its focus on the flows of affect between entangled partners. Nonetheless, dynamics of
enhancement of intimacy, pleasure, and desire must be thoroughly examined in the context
of emerging sexual technologies, including sex robots, particularly as it relates to labor,
reproduction, and dynamics of the neoliberal market (Atanasoski & Vora, 2020).
Furthermore, human-machine sexualities embrace more-than-human and geographical registers in both HMC (cf. Betlemidze, 2022; Dehnert, 2021) and SeS (Flore & Pienaar,
2020; Fox & Alldred, 2013) that fluidify (Lambevski, 2004) individualistic and humanistic
understandings of the sexuo-communicative subject-object relation in human-machine
sexualities. These perspectives raise questions such as, what exactly is meant by “communicative subject” in entangled and assembled human-machine interactions? Resonating with
the social relational turn, this essay continues rethinking agency, interactivity, directionality
of communication and desire, and more, in ecological terms of affective flows.
Additionally, this broadening of conceptualizing the (sexual) communication practices between humans and machines comes along with rethinking the role of sexuality
for the human. When humans engage with sex robots in communicative sexuotechnicalassemblages via human-machine sexual encounters, “what are the boundaries around
[human] sexuality” (Hearn, 2018, p. 1368)? Insights from asexuality studies scholars
demonstrate that, through discourses, instruments, and institutions, “‘sexuality’ effectively
became tied to humanity” (Flore, 2014, p. 18). As such, ongoing work by asexuality studies scholars works toward delinking the intimate, compulsory relationship between being
human and being sexual by making space for alternative modes of being and doing. Offering an alternative to person-based understandings of sexuality and sexual practices, morethan-human and assemblage-approaches resist clear-cut boundaries of (human) sexuality,
thereby embracing the messiness of sexuality (Manalansan, 2013), even (or particularly) in
the “sterile” context of machines.

Design Implications
Authors have predominantly critiqued representation and design of sex robots in relation
to sexualized and exaggerated images of the female body or engaged in speculative musing
on the ethical design of future sex robots (Döring et al., 2020). There is an insignificant integration of academic research and the design of sex robots, prompting calls for an integrated
understanding of sex robots that recognizes the sociotechnical development and nature
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of sex robots (Danaher, 2019a). Relatedly, designers can draw from SeS by being clearer
about the distinction between gender and sex in robot design. Recall that RealDoll (n.d.b)
offers sex robots in “three different gender orientations: Male, female and transsexual”
(p. 6). Clearly, these descriptors refer neither to gender nor to an orientation, which calls
for feminist and other critical approaches to more accurately imitate sex and gender in sex
robot design. Finally, shifting toward an assemblage-framework allows for broadening the
design of sex robots writ large, where “the obvious question we have to ask is: why should
a sex robot look like a human?” (Kubes, 2019, p. 10). Displacing concerns for human and
nonhuman subjects and objects allows for broadening our understanding of what a sex
robot can be and can look like. Modeling sex robots after different fantasies than the male
gaze so prevalent in pornographic and other representational accounts is one way to navigate the expectations surrounding humanoid robots (Danaher, 2019a).

Implications for the Use and Effects of Sex Robots
Reviewers (Döring et al., 2020; González-González et al., 2021) have identified a significant lack of empirical research conducted on actual use patterns and contexts as well as
user behavior, leaving most claims about effects squarely within philosophical, ethical, and
speculative realms (see Harper & Lievesley, 2020). Nonetheless, the assemblage-perspective
put forth in this essay allows at least for comments on rough implications regarding the
therapeutic use of sex robots and child robots, one of the most controversial components
of an already highly controversial topic (e.g., Chatterjee, 2020). Critical communication
and SeS perspectives call for a nuanced understanding of “therapeutic,” paying particular attention to undergirding systems of belief that target a/sexual, disabled, and nonnormative others in particular ways (Kafer, 2013; Wilkerson, 2011). Conjoining disability,
SeS, and queer perspectives, the therapeutic use of sex robots must always be understood
in the context of larger systems of meaning—which is reflected in the territorializingdeterritorializing-reterritorializing dynamics of the sexuality-assemblage (Fox & Alldred,
2013). That is, any calls for therapeutic use of sex robots must be critiqued: Therapy for
whom, why, in what ways, and based on what grounds? Similarly, the case of child sex
robots must be evaluated in the sociocultural context (Danaher, 2019b). Clearly, these
debates are far from settled and require thorough, interdisciplinary contributions from academics, designers/manufacturers, and the general public.

Conclusion
With most thought and reflections on sex robots being confined to speculation at this time,
this essay serves as a contribution to the ongoing, important debates on sex robots by conjoining two seemingly disconnected bodies of literature—HMC and SeS. Ongoing interdisciplinary work is needed as scholars make sense of current and future technological
advancements in the realm of the sexual. I have specifically called for and extended efforts
in the critical theorizing of sex robots in particular, and machines writ large. Questions
regarding intimacy, love, sex, and desire have occupied humans for thousands of years.
Reconceptualizing sex robots in the realm of human-machine sexualities, or communicative sexuotechnical-assemblages, allows for addressing the ways in which affective flows
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between humans and machines constitute sexuality, as well as recognizing the ways in
which notions of sex and sexuality are always tied to larger, deterritorialized systems of
meaning. Current and emerging technologies such as teledildonics, AI, and physical sex
robots offer vibrant potential for sex and sexuality, lying somewhere between utopian hopes
for orgasmic frenzies and dystopian fears of sterile and stale numbing down. The boundaries of (human) sexuality are broad, fringy, messy, and oftentimes unclear. This is even more
so the case as technology, and in particular sex robots, become increasingly entangled in
human sexual relations.
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